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Abstract
In this paper we develop a comprehensive short-term fi scal forecasting system of use for the 
real-time monitoring of the Spanish government’s borrowing requirement. Spain has been at 
the centre of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, not least because of sizeable failures 
in meeting public defi cit targets. The system comprises a suite of models, with different levels 
of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down; general government vs sub-sectors), which 
are suitable for the automatic processing of the large amount of monthly/quarterly fi scal 
data currently published by the Spanish statistical authorities. Our tools are instrumental in 
the ex-ante detection of risks to offi cial projections, and can thus help reduce the ex-post 
reputational costs of budgetary slippage. On the basis of our results, we discuss how offi cial 
monitoring bodies could expand, on one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence 
to targets (moving beyond a legalistic approach) and, on the other, their communication 
policies as regards sources of risks to (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets.
Keywords: government accountability, transparency, fi scal Forecasting.
JEL classifi cation: E62; E65; H6; C3; C82.
Resumen
En este trabajo presentamos una herramienta para el seguimiento en tiempo real de la ejecución 
presupuestaria de las Administraciones Públicas en España. La herramienta incorpora un 
conjunto amplio de modelos estadísticos, con diferentes niveles de agregación entre partidas 
presupuestarias y subsectores de las Administraciones Públicas, que permiten procesar de 
manera efi ciente la sustancial información mensual y trimestral publicada actualmente por las 
autoridades estadísticas en España. La principal utilidad de la herramienta es complementar 
el análisis habitualmente realizado para detectar de manera anticipada posibles riesgos de 
desviación con respecto a los objetivos fi scales ofi ciales.
Palabras clave: transparencia de las Administraciones Públicas, mecanismos de control 
presupuestario,  previsiones presupuestarias.
Códigos JEL: E62; E65; H6; C3; C82.
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1 Introduction
Government accountability is an essential principle of democracy through which elected and non
elected officials are obliged to explain to the parliament and the public in general their decisions,
actions and the consequences of these decisions and actions (see e.g., IMF, 2012; Hameed, 2005;
Leal et al., 2008). Most developed countries do have in place a framework of political, legal, and
administrative mechanisms designed to control government bodies and officials. Typically, these
controls focus on the adherence of the designed policies to the extant legal framework, and are not
designed to influence the ex-ante design of policies nor the ex-post responsibility of policy-makers
as regards the performance of their actions.
Planning errors can have enormous influence on the economy, in particular those related to
budgetary policies. For example systematic and/or sizeable budgetary forecast errors may spur
waves of lack of confidence on current governmental policies, and as a consequence affect the
economy as a whole via e.g. by tightening the constraints on financing channels for firms. In
addition, above-fundamentals financing of the public debt imposes a burden on future generations
of taxpayers. Indeed, it can be claimed that the reputational costs associated to lack of adherence
of budgetary outcomes to ex-ante budgetary targets were among the group of fundamental drivers
behind the recent sovereign debt crisis in the particular case of Spain, within the broader euro-area
crisis.
As a consequence, a significant change in the fiscal governance framework took place since
the end of 2011 in Spain, whereby an enhanced framework of national budgetary surveillance
entered into force as of mid-2012, enshrined in high-ranked legal documents (Constitution and
Royal Organic Law), including a huge leap forward in the availability of fiscal statistics and the
procedures governing all stages of budgetary planning, including the design and the implementation
phases. By now the link between the quality of fiscal frameworks and budgetary discipline is a well-
proven fact from an international perspective (see, e.g. von Hagen, 2010). In the case of Spain,
though, the new budgetary surveillance framework still has to prove its usefulness to control the
behavior of policy makers, as regards budgetary matters, in particular in the face of upcoming
electoral periods. But even assuming that policy makers were to have the will to fully implement
all the legal procedures in place and were to publish timely and non-controversial real-time fiscal
data, two potential weaknesses remain.
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including private and public analysts. On the contrary, it has become increasingly difficult for pri-
vate and public analysts alike to follow and interpret the continuous flow of monthly fiscal data that
is currently published by official statistical agencies in Spain. Indeed, just to quote one example,
in March 2012 the only monthly publication about government’s budgetary execution did refer to
the central government, while since the beginning of 2013 the Spanish statistical authorities do dis-
seminate monthly information following national accounts’ definitions for the central, regional and
social security sectors, including individual regional governments. This is a level of dissemination
of data on public accounts that has no parallel nowadays in Europe. Nevertheless, at the same
time, significant and not clearly explained revisions of headline, annual past fiscal data occurred
in 2012 and 2013, spurring doubts in private investors and analysts. Just to quote one example,
in a Reuters’ press news published as recently as November 2013, one could read: “Spain’s erratic
reporting of fiscal figures, especially from its regional authorities, and repeated revisions to data
have fuelled investor mistrust in the government’s effort to reduce one of the euro zone’s largest
public deficits”.1
Second, the budgetary control and monitoring procedures and institutions currently in place
in Spain,2 pose too much weight on the ex-post adherence of policy outcomes to certain legal and
administrative clauses, more than to the ex-ante design and reporting of policy actions, and the
real-time monitoring of budgetary execution. This is the standard approach in continental Europe,
but it remains to be seen if this approach would be able to detect in a timely fashion fiscal slippage,
and to send early-warning signals that could help develop timely corrective actions.
It is against this framework that in this paper we propose a broad set of models and tools
suitable for real-time monitoring of fiscal plans, including the assessment of the probability of
meeting fiscal targets, that allow for a quick and efficient processing of a vast amount of incoming
monthly, quarterly and annual information pertaining to most revenue and expenditure categories,
and for all sub-sectors of the General Government. The models are time-series, mixed-frequencies
models along the lines of Harvey and Chung (2000), Moauro and Savio (2005), Proietti and Moauro
(2006), and Pedregal and Pe´rez (2010).3 These papers use a temporal aggregation method that
First, more information does not necessarily mean better understanding and trust from users,
113 November 2013, Reuters on-line, “Spain sets up fiscal watchdog, doubts linger on independence”.
2In particular the legal provisions on budgetary surveillance procedures included in the new Budgetary Stability
Law (May 2012), and other comptroller institutions like the IGAE (State Accounts Comptroller) or the Court of
Exchequer (“Tribunal de Cuentas”). At the end of 2013 the Spanish Government also created an “Independent Fiscal
Authority” that should help in the monitoring process of budgetary plans.
3Other approaches for modeling data at different sampling intervals are the methods based on regression techniques
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relies on the information contained on related indicators observed at the desired higher frequency.
The statistical treatment of structural time series models is based on the state space form and the
Kalman Filter. In our case this approach allows the estimation of monthly and quarterly models
using annual, quarterly and monthly observations, and permit changes over time arising from an
increase in sample size. The State Space framework used allows us to build constrained forecasts
in order to evaluate how feasible a given annual target might result. By setting future values of the
relevant variable to the actual future policy target, we force a given model to converge to that very
target, regardless of how improbable such target might be. But the interesting part of this analysis
is that the model replicates a path of indicators compatible with the targets and all the information
available at each moment in time. In other words, the model shows a limiting monthly/quarterly
path for the indicators, necessary to meet the policy targets. We also proceed one step further
and adapt the approach of Go´mez and Guerrero (2006) in order to test whether official targets are
compatible with the natural unconditional true forecast of a given statistical model. Such a test
would produce evidence on the chances of meeting the target.
It is important to stress upfront in the paper that we see the usefulness of our models as a
benchmark for the interpretation of newly available data, and not as a substitute of the in-depth
analysis normally carried out by fiscal experts in policy institutions. A detailed knowledge of
institutional and special factors is a key ingredient for the short-term analysis of fiscal data, which
could be further exploited in conjunction with the toolkit presented in this paper.4 Nonetheless,
being aware that budget planning and implementation is more an art than a science (as claimed,
for example, by Leal et al., 2008), we are at the same time convinced that looking at short-term
fiscal data (i.e. data on the actual implementation of fiscal plans) through the lens of the kind of
tools and models we put forward in our paper could provide a neutral and transparent assessment
of adherence of observed budgetary data against the monthly/quarterly path consistent with the
achievement of annual fiscal targets. On the basis of our results, we discuss how official monitoring
bodies could expand, on the one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence to targets (moving
beyond a legalistic approach) and, on the other, their communication policies as regards sources of
risks of (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets, and the convenience to launch, when needed,
ex-ante corrective actions.
(Chow and Lin, 1971, Guerrero, 2003), the MIDAS (MIxed DAta Sampling) approach (see Ghysels, Santa-Clara &
Valkanov, 2004, Clements and Galva˜o, 2007), the state space approaches of Liu and Hall (2001) and Mariano and
Murusawa (2003), or the ARMA model model with missing observations of Hyung and Granger (2008).
4Along the same lines see also the discussion of Leal, Pedregal and Pe´rez (2010).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the related literature,
stressing the contributions of the current paper. The system presented in our paper could serve
as a side tool within the monitoring steps prescribed by current national fiscal rules in Spain. To
make this clear, in Section 3 we describe a number of institutional issues, namely the territorial
organization of Spain, one of the most fiscally decentralized countries in Europe, and the extant
framework of national fiscal rules. We also provide a description of ex-ante targets set in real-time
by Governments over the period 2008-2013, as well as its adherence to ex-post, published figures,
to make explicit the need to incorporate further tools in the national surveillance process. Then,
in Section 4 we turn to the description of the data available and the publication lags of official
information, to move next in Section 5 to the discussion of the methodological vagaries of our
models, and present formally their potential uses for actual policy-makers. Finally, in Section 6
we show some counterfactual, empirical results to somehow justify the validity of our approach, in
particular by means of a truly real-time example on the case of the fiscal year 2011, a year in which
the ex-post public deficit outcome turned out to exceed hugely ex-ante policy targets, taking by
surprise not only international organizations but also private sector analysts. Finally, in Section 7
we provide the main conclusions of the paper.
2 Related literature
Official annual fiscal targets and projections have been shown in the literature to display well-
documented political biases and/or large forecast errors. See for example, Strauch et al. (2004),
Moulin and Wierts (2006), Annett (2006), Pina and Venes (2011), Jonung and Larch (2006), Leal et
al. (2008), Merola and Pe´rez (2013), Frankel and Schreger (2013), and the references quoted therein.
At the same time a recent strand of the literature has shown that intra-annual fiscal data, when
modeled appropriately, contains extremely valuable and useful information for forecasting annual
fiscal aggregates, enabling earlier detection of episodes of fiscal deterioration (or improvement)
than traditional methods: for applications with euro area aggregate data and/or pools of euro area
countries’ data see Pe´rez (2007), Silvestrini et al. (2008), Onorante et al. (2009), Pedregal and
Pe´rez (2010), Paredes et al. (2009), Asimakopoulos et al. (2013). Despite this fact, monitoring
public finances in the very short-run by means of high-frequency fiscal data has not been an issue
traditionally tackled in the literature, even though it is usually part of the routine of practitioners.5
5The standard practice for factoring-in new intra-annual fiscal information on revised annual fiscal targets and
projections is via informed, judgemental add-in factors (Leal et al, 2008). The fact that budgetary projections
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For the case of Spain, some recent contributions to the latter literature are Ferna´ndez-Caballero,
Pe´rez and Pedregal (2012), that look at sub-national governments’ budgetary data,6, Leal and
Pe´rez (2009; 2005), that focus on the central government sector, 7 and Leal, Pe´rez and Pedregal
(2010). The latter paper constructs multivariate, state-space mixed-frequencies models for the
main components of the Spanish General Government sector made up of blocks for each one of its
sub-sectors.
The contribution of the our paper can be seen, from the methodological point of view, as a
step forward from Leal, Pe´rez and Pedregal (2010). In our paper we explore a much broader set
of models, confronting their quite aggregated models with a number of single-variable models, thus
enabling a clean comparison of bottom-up versus top-down approaches to the problem at hand:
monitoring and forecasting general government borrowing requirements. A second contribution
of our paper is that we cover the whole euro area period, 1999Q1 till 2012Q4, i.e. in particular
we cover all crisis years up to the last fiscal year for which data is available as of the cut-off
date of information for our paper. Thirdly, we integrate in our models the substantial amount of
statistical data that has been made available by the Spanish statistical authorities since the end of
2010. Finally, and quite notably, our paper goes beyond previous only research-oriented academic
contributions and provides, in addition to the research contribution, a fully-implementable toolbox
usable for real-time monitoring of public finances. As regards the latter, a database of monthly
and quarterly fiscal indicators fully updated every week is provided with the paper,8 as well as
a fully-documented MATLAB toolbox that uploads the data, runs all the models and provides
are prepared in annual terms, given an annual budgetary cycle, and the discretionary nature of many government
measures set up for the entire year, have traditionally limited the role of high-frequency fiscal data for monitoring
annual budgetary targets in the course of the year.
6They make three main contributions. First, they compile a dataset on quarterly and monthly sub-national
governments’ spending variables, and indicators, by reviewing all available, scattered sources, and put together a
database usable for economic analysis. Second, they exploit the compiled information by fitting time-series, mixed-
frequencies models to the data, and show the forecasting and monitoring capabilities of the selected short-term
spending indicators. Third, they show that official annual budgetary targets presented useful guidance as to the
actual course of sub-national fiscal spending, in particular when combined with short-term indicators-based forecasts.
Leal and Pe´rez (2005) assess adherence to announced budgetary targets of a set of fiscal revenue data for the
Autonomous Community of Andalusia, by employing the methodology of Kanda (2002) to evaluate the likelihood of
meeting annual fiscal revenue targets, given partial-year monthly data.
7They develop a temporal aggregation ARIMA model to monitor and forecast the annual Spanish central govern-
ment
8See also de Castro et al. (2014) for details on the input database.
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standardized output files, also available from the authors upon request. All in all, some 20 different
models are run over a dataset including more than 200 fiscal variables, and this is done automatically
in a few hours of computing time.
3 Some institutional and policy issues
A number of institutional matters have to be discussed before jumping to the econometric method-
ology. This is so, because, first, Spain is a quite fiscally decentralized country, but has been so
in successive waves of fiscal decentralization since the early 1980s. This devolution process is also
reflected in the different coverage of available fiscal time series over time. Secondly, the Budgetary
Stability Law that entered into force in May 2012 implied a substantial step forward in two respects
quite relevant for the purposes of our paper. On the one hand, the law posed quite some empha-
sis on ex-ante and ex-post monitoring and control procedures. On the other hand, the Law has
contributed fundamentally to the transparency of fiscal accounts, meaning that a huge additional
amount of fiscal data has become public since May 2012.
3.1 The territorial structure
Spain is currently one of the most decentralized countries in the European Union. As an example,
in 2010 close to 50% of general government expenditure was carried out by sub-national govern-
ments (see, e.g. Herna´ndez de Cos and Pe´rez, 2013a). This is the result of a gradual transfer of
responsibilities for the management of specific services from the Central Government to the Re-
gional Governments since the beginning of the 1980s. The transfer of expenditure responsibilities
from the Central Government to the regions has, however, neither come about at the same pace,
nor have they been on the same scale for all of them. The main differences concern the time at
which the various regions took over education and health competencies. In parallel to this process
of devolution of expenditure responsibilities to the regions, a financing system for the sub-national
governments was also progressively developed. Again, the process was not completely homogeneous
across regions, and changed more or less every five years. In particular, the last reform of the fi-
nancing agreements was approved at the end of 2009. The new system raised the amount of taxes
transferred (to 50% in the case of the personal income tax and VAT; to 58% in the case of excise
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duties on manufactured production of alcohol, tobacco and hydrocarbons)9 and Regions received
additional powers to modify their rates in some of these taxes. 10 In the case of local governments,
the spending responsibilities assigned to them are regulated by the Local Government Act of 1985,
which establishes a minimum list of services to be provided by them, the so-called compulsory ser-
vices. This list of “compulsory services” increases with population size.11 As a result, the financing
system of local governments also changes with size.
The long process of devolution of spending and revenue capabilities to the regions has several
implications for the purposes of our project. Firstly, the changes in the revenue system/spending
responsibilities (substantial up to 2002 for spending, and up to 2009 for revenue) induced structural
breaks in the time series of the sub-sectors of the general government, and make it difficult the
evaluation of the performance of dedicated models on the basis of past data. Regional/local govern-
ment data of sufficient quality and at the quarterly/monthly frequency has only been disseminated
quite recently, and its usefulness in general-purpose models is still limited (see the discussion in
Ferna´ndez-Caballero et al., 2010). Secondly, notwithstanding the previous comment, it is possible
to set up models for the sub-sectors of the general government, but more from a forward-looking
point of view, i.e. it is hard to validate them on the basis of standard, out-of-sample forecasting
exercises, but looking forward this does not invalidate its potential use for current policy-making.
3.2 The budgetary surveillance framework
In September 2011 it was decided to reinforce the prevailing framework of budgetary rules in
Spain with the approval of a constitutional reform. The reform enshrines in the Constitution the
obligation for all tiers of the general government sector to adjust their conduct to the principle of
budgetary stability. Subsequently, on 27 April 2012, the Organic Law of Budgetary Stability and
Financial Sustainability (BSL) implementing this constitutional reform was approved, replacing
the stability laws in force. The BSL made significant amendments to the definitions of and the
mechanisms for determining the deficit, debt and public spending limits applicable to the different
9Regions keep the 100% collection of the hydrocarbon-oil retail sales, electricity tax, property and stamp duty
tax, tax of registration of motor vehicles, taxes on gaming, wealth tax and inheritance and gift tax.
10In addition, the criteria for distributing the different tax revenues and transfers to the regions changed. See e.g.
Hernandez de Cos and Pe´rez (2013a) for details on these issues.
11For additional details see, e.g. Sole´-Olle´ and Bosch (2007). On January 2014 a new “Local government reform
act” entered into force, that incorporated a number of new elements to the definition of services provided by local
governments.
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levels of government, along with changes in correction procedures and mechanisms in the event
of slippage (see, e.g. Herna´ndez de Cos and Pe´rez, 2013b). The BSL establishes a very detailed
procedure for the annual setting of budgetary objectives for the overall general government sector
and its agents. Further, it details the mechanisms for the monitoring of the fulfilment of these
objectives, it establishes significant improvements in terms of transparency of public finances and
it provides for a set of instruments to prevent slippage or to redress it should it arise. In the one
year and a half in which the BSL has been applied so far, quarterly reports have been issued on
non-compliant regional governments, and even though this has been an improvement with respect
to previous practice, they tend to adopt a backward-looking perspective, and no preemptive action
has been asked, despite repeated occurrence of non-compliance with pre-set fiscal targets. Precisely,
it is in these type of quarterly reports in which the use of additional tools of the kind discussed in
our paper could be of help.
In addition to the BSL, the Spanish Parliament approved in November 2013 the creation of the
so-called “Independent Fiscal Responsibility Authority” (AIReF), that became operational over
the first half of 2014. According to the law that establishes this new figure, its aim is “to guarantee
effective compliance by all public authorities with the principles of budgetary and financial stabil-
ity”, principles that were introduced in Spanish legislation by the September 2011 constitutional
reform and subsequently developed in the BSL in 2012. The AIReF is in charge of issuing reports
on government’s macroeconomic forecasts and budgetary plans, and monitoring adherence of the
different public administrations to budgetary targets.
3.3 The European budgetary surveillance framework
Beyond national fiscal rules, EU countries are subject to the scrutiny of the European Commission,
on the one hand, and the multilateral surveillance of the peer EU countries, following procedures
defined within the confines of the so-called Stability and Groth Pact (SGP). Moreover, as a re-
sponse to the 2010-2011 European sovereign debt crisis, and extensive reform of the SGP and the
broader economic governance framework was adopted in 2011 (see European Commission, 2013).
Six pieces of legislation (the “Six pack”) reformed both the preventive and corrective arms of the
SGP. The latter reform followed the introduction of the so-called “European Semester”, a sub-
stantially improved surveillance system, covering not only fiscal monitoring but also more general
macroeconomic issues.
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Figure 1: Multi-annual budgetary targets and outcomes over the crisis: 2008-2013. General
government balance targets as percentage of GDP.a
Panel A. From the burst of the economic crisis to the first consolidation package 
 
Panel B. The pre-sovereign crisis period – the 2010 target is met 
 
Panel C. The 2011 fiscal slippage 
 
Panel D. The 2012 fiscal adjustment and the relaxation of the consolidation path 
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a SOURCE: Stability and Convergence Programmes (including mid- and/or end-year updates). The government
balance excludes the one-off impact of financial assistance to the banking sector in 2011, 2012 and 2013.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1416
3.4 Budgetary targets during the crisis
Since the burst of the economic and financial crisis in 2008, the adherence of realized government
policies to budgetary targets has been a story of defeats, in most European countries. Certainly,
it has been the case in Spain. The difficulties in forecasting government borrowing needs are well
documented in the literature, not only by governments, but also by other fiscal forecasters – see,
e.g. Hannon (2014). An unanticipated revision of the estimated deficit by the government can be
unpredictable (due to unforeseen adverse economic shocks and their impact via automatic stabi-
lizers) or predictable if some type of strategic/electoral behaviour is considered, as the literature
on politically-motivated fiscal forecasts would suggest. Without entering into any type of positive
analysis, in this sub-section we describe the target public deficit paths defined by the Spanish and
European authorities for the Spanish General Government sector over the period 2008-2013. This
is done in Figure 1.
According to the Spring 2009 EDP notification, the Spanish general government recorded a
deficit of 3.8% of GDP in the fiscal year 2008. By June 2008 most national and international
institutions still projected a budgetary surplus for 2008, and only some institutions timidly turned
their estimates to small deficits for the whole year after the summer. Nevertheless, as late as
October 2008 the government still estimated a deficit of 1.5% of GDP, slightly above the 1.6%
deficit projected by the European Commission around the same date (see EC, 2008). The same
estimate for 2008 was kept as a reference by the government in the budget law for 2009 that
passed parliamentary approval at the end of December. At the beginning of January, though, in
the framework of the updated Stability Programme for 2008-2012 (line “JAN-2009” in Panel A of
Figure 1), the government provided an estimated deficit for 2008 of 3.4% of GDP, close to the final
figure. At the same time, the whole medium-term deficit target path was revised downwards, and
the objective for 2009 was set at close to 6% of GDP.
Nevertheless, the deepening of the crisis and, mainly, the fiscal stimulus packages enacted at the
end of 2009 led the general government deficit well beyond 11% of GDP. Also in the summer of 2009
Spain was put under an “Excessive Deficit Procedure” (EDP), whereby the “Excessive deficit” had
to be corrected by 2013 (i.e. in 2013 the overall government deficit had to be at or below 3%). The
significant deterioration of public finances led to the May 2010 public debt crisis, that forced the
government to launch a sizeable fiscal consolidation package, including across-the-board spending
cuts that hinged particularly on the wage bill. The medium-term target of a deficit of 3% of GDP
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Figure 2: The 2011 fiscal targets (red, horizontal lines): forecast prepared by dif-
ferent private and public institutions for the general government balance in 2011,
from different forecast origins.a
-9.5  
-8.5  
-7.5  
-6.5  
-5.5  
03/10 06/10 09/10 12/10 03/11 06/11 09/11 12/11 
Consensus Forecast Official target EC IMF OECD 
% of GDP
Spring 2012    EDP 
Notification 
a SOURCE: Stability and Convergence Programmes, Consensus Forecast, OECD, IMF and EC Spring
and Autumn reports, several years. The grey area represents the distance between the max and min
forecast within the Consensus Forecast pool of forecasters.
in 2013 was maintained, but part of the assumed fiscal consolidation effort was front-loaded to 2011
(difference between lines “JUN-2010” and “JAN-2010” in Panel A).
The May 2010 fiscal adjustment plan was perceived by markets and international organizations
as broadly credible, given that the 2010 revised fiscal target was met. The successive medium-
term plan/objectives (April 2011, June 2010) kept the same targets, also in line with the EDP
requirements. This is clear from Panel B of Figure 1. The government insisted until the very
end of 2011 that the objective of a 6% of GDP deficit in 2011 was reachable. But the April
2012 publication of the 2011 budgetary outcome showed a public deficit outcome well-above 8.5%.
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 2, the government managed to anchor the expectations of private
forecasters (summarized by the mean of the “Consensus Forecast” panel) and independent public
analysts (European Commission, OECD and IMF). The anticipated budgetary deviation was on
average less than 1% of GDP, and even the most extreme forecaster fell short of the deficit figure
published in Spring 2012 (a deficit of 8.5% of GDP in 2011), that was even revised upwards in
subsequent revisions.
The fiscal slippage of 2011 brought about a substantial reaction by the markets, and the Euro-
pean Council, also in view of adverse macroeconomic projections, decided to loosen the adjustment
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path toward the EDP, that was postponed by one year to 2014 (Panel C of Figure 1). In the
year 2012 the fiscal adjustment was quite sizeable, also in view of adverse economic conditions,
and the deficit was significantly reduced (in particular in structural terms), even though the target
deficit-to-GDP ratio was missed by some half percent of GDP. In view of the effective action taken
by the Spanish government in 2012, the path of adjustment towards the 3% was relaxed again in
June 2013, in such a way that the end to the EDP procedure was postponed till 2016.
The previous discussion has been kept on purpose at a descriptive level. There are no published
studies on the economic and political-economy determinants of budgetary deviations for the general
government in Spain. Nevertheless, some papers have documented for the central government sector
(Estado) the existence of systematic biases in budget estimates when compared to realized outcomes,
for the pre-crisis period (from the 1980s till 2009). In this respect see Leal and Pe´rez (2009)
and Pons and Sole´ (2001) that analyze these issues in empirical frameworks in which economic,
institutional and political-economy controls are included. See also the more descriptive approach
of Edo (2012). On the determinants of the budgetary deviations of regional governments see Leal
and Lo´pez-Laborda (2014) and Argimo´n and Mart´ı (2006).
4 Description of the data and publication lags
4.1 The data
As mentioned above, the excellent coverage of central government budgetary execution accounts at
the monthly frequency, kept on loosing relevance as the devolution process to regional governments
continued over the 1990s and, specially, the 2000s. The BSL posed a great deal of emphasis on
the transparency of budget plans and the production of new budgetary execution statistics. As
regards the former, the BSL states that the budgets of all general government tiers should include
exact information so as to relate the balance of revenue and spending in the budget to net lending
or net borrowing according to the European System of Accounts (ESA). As regards the latter, the
BSL establishes some minimum reporting requirements for regions and municipalities, including
most notably monthly outturns of regional governments’ revenue and spending, and quarterly
outturns in the case of local governments, along with all the information needed to calculate the
budgetary outturn in terms of national accounts.12 Thus, from June 2012, the IGAE began to
12Ministerial Order HAP/2105/2012 of 1 October 2012 implementing the reporting obligations envisaged in the
BSL.
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regularly publish quarterly accounts of all general government sub-sectors in terms of ESA95.
Also, since October 2012, the statistical agencies have been publishing regularly monthly regional
governments’ accounts in terms of budgetary accounts and, since March 2013, regional and Social
Security monthly accounts in terms of national accounts.
From the point of view of fitting empirical models, the newly published time series, that cover at
most one year and a half, are of limited use. Nevertheless, they will become the series of references
in the future, and have to be somehow connected to the rest of the information on which a wealth
of historical information is available. Table 1 shows a summary of the main variables included in
the dataset employed in the paper. It comprises a total amount of some 200 time series, taken from
different official providers of statistics (IGAE, INE, BDSICE, Bank of Spain), and covers the period
1985-2013. The data covers the General Government sector and its subsectors. Part of the dataset
is in line with ESA95 standards, while another part follows public accounts (cash) accounting rules.
4.2 Publication lags and timing convention
Annual fiscal outturns for a given year t are published at the very end of March of year t + 1.
Quarterly non-financial accounts for the General government and all its sub-sectors are published
regularly with a delay of 90 days. Monthly data for the State sector (“Estado”) are published
with a lag of one month. Also with a lag of one month are published the data on shared taxes’
collection, and social security system outturns, in both cases in cash terms. As regards the newly
available information, monthly national accounts data for the Central Government, the regions and
the Social Security, are published with a delay of broadly two months.
For the counterfactual, forecasting exercises that will follow in a subsequent section of the paper,
following the information provided in the previous paragraph we replicate the real-time constraints
faced by real-time fiscal policy analysts, and thus we adopt the timing rules displayed in Table 2,
following the standard dates of dissemination of data at the different frequencies. We deem this
convention as a fair heuristic representation of reality, on average.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that in a first exercise we will not use real-time data, but
revised data as available in October 2013. Of course, the empirical exercises that follow would have
some counter-factual features in that data revisions might have affected the lessons drawn from the
application of the toolbox in relation to a today’s re-creation. Given the absence of historical data
records, it is not possible to fully re-create the real-time nominal fiscal series that would have been
available at each point in time time. Nevertheless, we illustrate the specific case of the year 2011
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Table 1: Summary of the data used in the fiscal surveillance system.
Non-financial series ESA95 coverage* Periodicity Sample 
period 
Basis Source** Units 
              
General government total revenue  S.13 GG 
Annual, 
quarterly 
1985-
2012 
 
GG: 
2000Q1-
2012Q4 
 
Rest: 
2004Q1-
2013Q3 
ESA95 
INE 
(BADESPE 
database), 
IGAE 
Mrd 
EUR 
General government total expenditure  
Central government total revenue  S.1311 CG 
Central government total expenditure  
Regional government total revenue S.1311 RG 
Regional government total expend. 
Social Security total revenue  S.1314 SS 
Social Security total expenditure  
Labour force survey: GG employment 
Monthly affiliates to SS in non-market 
 Monthly, Quarterly 
1995-
2012  
IGAE, INE, 
Eurostat, other 
 
Investment of Estado 
Public work tenders 
AEAT public wages indicators 
Direct taxes 
S.13 GG 
 
 
S.1311 subsector 
(Estado) 
Monthly, or 
Quarterly 
1985-
2012 
ESA95 
 
Cash 
IGAE and INE 
Indirect taxes 
VAT taxes 
Social security contributions 
Other revenues 
Real government consumption 
Nominal Government consumption 
Public investment 
Other capital expenditure 
Interest payments 
Social payments 
Subsidies 
Other expenditures 
PUBLIC DEBT 
Total cash non-financial receipts S.1314 subsector 
(Social Security 
System) Cash 
Min. of Economics 
/ Ministry of Social 
Security 
 
Total contributory social benefits 
   Pensions 
   Unemployment benefits 
Min. of Economics 
/ Ministry of Social 
Security 
 
Total expenditure 
S.1314 subsector 
(Public State 
Employment Service) 
Public State 
Emp. Service 
Ceded (own) taxes of regional 
governments 
 
Regional governments Monthly 1984-2012 Cash BDSICE database   
Shared taxes 
   Personal income tax  
   Corporate Taxes 
   VAT 
   Excise duties 
Central + regional + 
local governments Monthly 
1995-
2012 Cash BDSICE database   
(*) ESA European System Account; GG General Government; CG Central Government; LG Regional and Local Governments’ aggregate; SS Social Security. 
(**) INE Spanish National Institute;  IGAE General Comptroller of the State Administration 
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Table 2: Assumptions about availability of data for the counterfactual, pseudo-real-time, forecasting
exercises.
First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
(March) (June) (September) (December)
Annual data Year Year Year Year
up to t− 2 t− 1 (April) t− 1 t− 1
Quarterly data Third quarter Fourth quarter First quarter Second quarter
up to t− 1 t− 1 (April) t t
Monthly data January April July October
up to t t t t
Table 3: Forecasting the 2011 fiscal year in real time: information available in February 2011, June
2011 September 2011, November 2011 and February 2012.
February June September November February
2011 2011 2011 2011 2012
Annual data Year Year Year Year Year
up to 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010
Quarterly data Third quarter Fourth quarter First quarter Second quarter Second quarter
up to 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011
Monthly data December March July September November
up to 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011
for which we have compiled a truly real-time database. In Table 3 we show the exact information
available at each specific date of reference.
5 Main features of the toolkit
5.1 A suite of models
Given the different sampling frequencies of the time series included in our dataset, we estimate
multivariate, mixed-frequencies models, of the unobserved components type (along the lines of
Harvey and Chun, 2000). These type of models have been used with success in the field of fiscal
forecasting. Their flexibility allows us to accommodate a number of policy-relevant exercises. We
develop a number of models that look at the data from different, complementary approaches. In
particular:
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• Model 1 (“Joint model”): this is an aggregated model for total revenues and expenditures
of the general government sector in national accounts. Three “indicators” (public accounts
series pertaining to the central government and the social security system) are used for each
general government aggregate, but the model is estimated jointly so that the dynamics of
revenues and expenditures are jointly determined. This is in line with the literature, that
predicts a tight linkage between revenues and expenditures (in the form of bi-directional
causality relationships). The model is set up and estimated at the monthly frequency.
• Model 2 (“Direct model”): this is an aggregated model for the general government sector
balance in national accounts terms. Short-term indicators are the monthly balances of the
sub-sectors of the general government, in public accounts’ terms. The model is set up and
estimated at the monthly frequency.
• Model 3 (“Disaggregated model, components of total revenues and total expenditures”): sin-
gle models for each one of the sub-components of total general government revenues and ex-
penditures are produced independently, and forecasts for the general government borrowing
requirements are produced by bottom-up aggregation. The models are set up and estimated
at the quarterly frequency.
• Model 4 (“Disaggregated model, total revenues and total expenditures”): single models for
total general government revenues and expenditures are produced independently, and fore-
casts for the general government borrowing requirements are produced by substraction. The
models are set up and estimated at the quarterly frequency.
• Model 5 (“Joint, sectoral models”): models by each one of the sub-sectors of the General
Government (Central, Regions, Social Security) along the lines of Model 1. Forecasts for the
general government borrowing requirements are produced by aggregation.
• Model 6 (“Direct, sectoral models”): models by each one of the sub-sectors of the general
government (Central, Regions, Social Security) along the lines of Model 2. Forecasts for the
general government borrowing requirements are produced by aggregation.
The classes of models considered allow in particular to address the questions of interest, while
at the same time providing information on the “bottom-up versus top-down” dichotomy and the
“aggregate general government approach versus approach by sub-sectors” dichotomy. All the mod-
els can be written in a common general form as described in Appendix A. Our approach is closely
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related to Harvey and Chung (2000), Moauro and Savio (2005), and Proietti and Moauro (2006).
These papers use a temporal aggregation method that relies on the information contained on related
indicators observed at the desired higher frequency. The statistical treatment of structural time
series models is based on the state space form and the Kalman Filter (see Harvey, 1989). In our
case this approach allows the estimation of a monthly model using annual, quarterly and monthly
observations, and permit changes over time arising from an increase in sample size.
5.2 Evaluating the probability of meeting the budgetary target
The methodology used, i.e. the State Space framework, allows for some easy and relevant exercises.
It is straightforward to build constrained forecasts in order to evaluate how feasible a given target
might result. By setting future values of the indicated variables to the actual future targets of
a given public agency, we force the model to converge to that target (due to the built-in time
constraints in the model), regardless of how absurd or improbable such targets might be. But the
interesting part of this analysis is that the model replicates a path of indicators compatible with
the targets and all the information available at each moment in time. In other words, the model
shows a limiting monthly path for the indicators necessary to meet the future annual targets issued
by the agency.
We can proceed one step further still in a more formal way, by testing whether a given gov-
ernment target, or a given forecast provided by any public or private agency, is compatible with
the natural unconditional true forecasts of the model. Such a test would produce evidence in favor
or against the chances of meeting that very target. Following an adaptation of e.g. Go´mez and
Guerrero (2006) for a general State-Space model, let’s assume all noises in the model are Gaussian,
R is a vector of m future targets supplied by an independent agency and YF are the forecasts
of the model, with covariance matrix Σy. Meeting the constraints imply that R = YF + u, with
u ∼ N(0,Σu), a noise that is assumed independent of any other noises in the model. Then, the
formal compatibility test consists of evaluating the distance d = R − YF , which distribution is
N(0,Σy + Σu). For the estimated values in a particular model the compatibility test is based on
the statistic
K = d′ (Σu +Σy)−1 d/m ∼ Fm,r (1)
where r is the length of the series minus the number of parameters involved in the model. Two cases
may be distinguished: (i) The targets are considered as binding constraints, i.e. the constraints
ought to be met exactly. This is equivalent to saying that u = 0; (ii) The targets are unbinding
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constraints, i.e. the constraints are met “statistically”, not exactly with u = 0. Here feasible
estimation of Σu is necessary in order to carry out the test. It is not clear how a reliable estimation
of this covariance may be obtained in general, being the most obvious (though not free from
problems) to rely on a sufficient long chain of previous forecast errors.
One way of avoiding the not obvious problem of Σu estimation and still more informative is to
use the distribution of the statistic above to calculate probabilities of meeting the targets. This
is the approach followed in our paper. In this regard, a distinction between public deficit and
revenues on the one hand, and public expenditures on the other, has to be taken into account.
Certainly, meeting a deficit or revenue target means in practice achieving a value greater or equal
to the target, as a matter of fact, the further is the unconditional forecast above the target implies
a greater probability of meeting such a target. Formally, the probability of meeting the target
would translate into P (YF ≥ R). If the unconditional forecast hits exactly the target, then the
probability of meeting the target is 0.5. On the other hand, for expenditures further unconditional
forecasts below the target is evidence of a high probability of meeting the target, formally we ought
to calculate P (YF ≤ R).
6 Empirical illustrations
6.1 Some general remarks
We perform a rolling forecasting exercise in which the selection of the forecast origin and the
information set available at each date are carefully controlled for. In particular we evaluate the
forecasts generated from four forecast origins per year from March 1999 to December 2012, which
makes up to 14 × 4 projections at each forecast horizon. The first forecast origin is March 1999,
and following the timing convention outlined before (see Table 2) the annual information available
covers up to the year 1997, the quarterly information up to 1998:Q3, and the monthly information
up to January 1999. The second forecast origin is June 1999, with annual information up to
1998, quarterly up to 1998:Q4 and monthly up to January-April 1999. Then we move the forecast
origin to September 1999 and so on and so forth until December 1999. We focus on the forecast
performance for annual projections, i.e. forecasts generated from each forecast origin for the end
of the current year, as this is the main horizon of use for mechanical, time-series based forecast.
From the point of view of a practitioner, forecasts of fiscal variables for a horizon longer than the
current year is of less importance. Our tools are developed to monitor the budget, and the latter,
in the case of Spain, follows an annual cycle.
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For the nominal public balance, the forecast error committed for year t by model J from forecast
origin Q is defined as
εBAL,Jt,Q ≡ (BALt −BALt−1)−
(
EJΩ,Q [BALt]− EJΩ,Q [BALt−1]
)
(2)
where Ω makes reference to the information set available at the time of generating a given
forecast, as described in Table 2. For revenue and expenditure items, the error committed in year
t for item I by model J from forecast origin Q is defined as
εI,Jt,Q ≡
(
It
It−1 − 1
)
∗ 100−
(
EJΩ,Q[It]
EJΩ,Q[It−1]
− 1
)
∗ 100 (3)
We compute two standard quantitative measures of forecasting performance for a number of
pseudo-real-time forecasting exercises. On the one hand, the ratio of the Root Mean Squared Errors
(RMSE) of the different alternative models with respect to an annual random walk (i.e. no-change)
alternative. On the other hand, we also look at a qualitative measure of forecast performance,
namely, whether the predicted change coincided or not with the actual change observed in the
variable of interest. We also present, as discussed in a previous Section, a truly real-time exercise,
focused on the 2011 fiscal year, given the relevance of the budgetary deviation observed that year.
6.2 Bottom-up vs top-down models
The results of a first exercise are presented in Table 4. In that table we show the relative root mean
squared error of our models compared to the annual random walk extrapolation for a number of
cases: (i) aggregate of the forecast errors generated for the whole year from all forecasts origins
(baseline); (ii) forecasts errors computed on the basis of forecasts computed taking as forecasts origin
the first quarter (Q1), the second (Q2), the third (Q3) and the fourth (Q4); (iii) these exercises are
presented for the whole sample used for the rolling forecasting exercise (“Full sample”, 1999-2012),
and for the crisis sample (2008-2012). The following messages can be highlighted from Table 4 for
a subset of the results obtained, namely the aggregated results for the general government balance,
revenues and expenditures.
First, when looking at the full sample, and pooling all forecast errors (resulting from forecast
origins Q1 to Q4), the most aggregated models (i.e. those that model directly the budget deficit),
models 1 (general government) and model 6 (sub-sectors), are the best. All other models are close
to these ones, with the exception of model 4. This relative ranking of models is broadly kept when
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Table 4: Quantitative forecasting performance of alternative models: summary of results for
the general government balance, revenue and expenditure.‡
General Government balance Total revenues Total expenditures
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M1 M3 M4 M5 M1 M3 M4 M5
Full Sample 0.88 0.91 0.96 1.19 1.01 0.90 1.04 1.01 1.15 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.86 1.31
Q1 0.95 0.99 1.05 1.20 1.18 0.99 1.15 1.18 1.17 1.03 0.98 0.89 0.78 1.23
Q2 1.12 1.17 1.16 1.43 1.21 1.09 1.38 1.10 1.33 1.14 1.17 1.28 1.04 1.68
Q3 0.70 0.75 0.84 1.19 0.77 0.73 0.87 0.85 1.15 0.96 0.80 0.80 0.91 1.21
Q4 0.55 0.47 0.62 0.88 0.58 0.66 0.50 0.71 0.92 0.84 0.74 0.72 0.78 1.15
Crisis 0.84 0.87 0.95 1.20 1.00 0.90 0.87 1.00 1.15 0.96 0.67 0.56 0.86 1.25
Q1 0.91 0.97 1.05 1.20 1.18 0.99 1.04 1.18 1.16 1.03 0.61 0.61 0.76 1.11
Q2 1.10 1.11 1.13 1.43 1.19 1.09 1.05 1.11 1.34 1.11 0.96 0.68 1.13 1.70
Q3 0.68 0.72 0.84 1.20 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.82 1.16 0.93 0.68 0.45 0.94 1.23
Q4 0.48 0.42 0.62 0.89 0.55 0.63 0.42 0.66 0.91 0.68 0.40 0.29 0.70 1.18
‡ The numbers in the table are the ratios of Root Mean Squared Errors of the errors obtained with each model
(labeled models 1 to 6) with respect to an annual random walk approach (no-change baseline). Forecast errors are
computed as follows. For the nominal balance, the error committed for year t by model J from forecast origin Q is
defined as εBAL,Jt,Q ≡ (BALt −BALt−1)−
(
EJΩ,Q [BALt]− EJΩ,Q [BALt−1]
)
. For revenue and expenditure items,
the error committed in year t for item I by model J from forecast origin Q is defined as εI,Jt,Q ≡
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
∗ 100 -(
EJΩ,Q[It]
EJ
Ω,Q[It−1]
− 1
)
∗100. Ω makes reference to the information set available at the time of generating a given forecast,
as described in Table 2.
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looking into forecasts from each origin (Q1 to Q4, taken individually). Thus, with the exception of
models 3 versus 4, in the other two cases more aggregate models outperform more disaggregated
models. This can be taken as evidence that bottom-up approaches are not necessarily better than
top-down ones, at least as regards forecast accuracy. Of course, in real-time, bottom-up approaches
provide the advantage of giving a more comprehensive view, which can be an asset in cases like the
current one in which overall performance across models is not overwhelmingly different. The main
results on bottom-up versus top-down holds when looking into sub-samples.
Second, in general, the forecast accuracy of all models is better in the crisis sample than in the
“expansion” one. This may reflect the fact that the models can do a fair job in periods of significant
changes, while in a period with no fiscal stress and persistent economic growth, it is more difficult
to beat a simple extrapolation of the past.
Third, across quarters, the forecasting performance of all models improves when more infor-
mation about revenue collection and the implementation of spending plans kicks-in. This is quite
clear in the second half of the year compared to forecasts prepared in the first half. In particular,
in Q3 a fair amount of information for the first half of the year is assumed to be available, but
only the first quarter of the general government accounts, while in Q4 the first half of the year
is fully known. For projections prepared from forecast origin Q2 things are quite different. In
our timing convention this is the quarter in which the annual figure of year t − 1 is known. This
seems to create a discontinuity in how models process incoming information, as forecast accuracy is
worse than Q1-based forecasts, a fact that may be linked to the realization of past data revisions,
including the appearance of “hidden spending” not reflected in monthly/quarterly indicators.
Fourth, when looking at revenue and expenditure errors, the same general results as regards full-
sample versus crisis-sample forecasts, and as regards first semester versus second semester forecasts,
hold. Interestingly, models add more information compared to the simple random walk baseline in
the case of expenditures than in the case of revenues, i.e. in general relative RMSEs tend to be
lower across models, though not in all cases. This provides some evidence on the ability of models
to accommodate purely within-the-year discretionary policy changes.
Some interesting results can be highlighted from the particular set of revenue/expenditure
projections. In the case of total revenues: (i) the aggregated, joint revenue-expenditures model
(model 1, “M1”) tends to be the best performer, in particular in the case of the crisis period; this is
the case versus the bottom-up approach, M3, and model M4 that does not exploit the link between
revenues and expenditures; (ii) as regards the other models, M3 seems to be the best in general,
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even though it is not clear-cut along all the dimensions considered (full-sample/pre-crisis, across
quarters). As regards total expenditures: (i) bottom-up approaches seem to provide (marginal)
better results, being clear from the comparison of M3 versus M1, which makes sense given that,
in particular, fiscal consolidations tend to have a differentiated profile for the different spending
components; while social payments tend to increase in crisis times (unemployment benefits) or to
stay, at most, stable (pensions), other components like public investment, or the wage bill, tend
to move in the opposite direction in fiscal adjustment periods - this is a differentiated element
when compared to government revenues, that are subject to similar macroeconomic shocks, even
though tax hikes can be uneven across revenue aggregates; (ii) the aggregation of sectoral models
(M5) performs quite badly in the case of TOE, which is not surprising given the fact that central
government transfers to the rest of the sectors, in particular to the social security, tend to occur
during the year, distorting, thus, the genuine signals of sectoral data.
Beyond the comparison of alternative models across several dimensions of this subsection, it is by
now a proven fact in the literature that the combination of alternative models tends to outperform
individual models. In the next subsection of the paper we exploit that dimension of our models.
6.3 The usefulness of the combination of models
In tables 5 and 6 we compare the performance of the combination of models’ forecasts with the
forecasts of the European Commission (EC henceforth). As shown in Artis and Marcellino (2001)
and Keereman (1999), the forecast record of the EC is among the best of the international or-
ganizations producing regular forecasts for European countries, and in particular Spain (others
include the International Monetary Fund and the OECD). EC forecasts tend to make use of all
of the information available at the time the forecasts are done, not only observed data, but also
all available, forward-looking information on budgetary plans, including additional corrective pack-
ages enacted by the governments in the course of the year. EC forecasts are based on a bottom–up
approach. In addition, EC fiscal forecasts use both macroeconomic models and expert judgement.
That is why checking the performance of the models (specifically, a combination of them) against
EC forecasts should be quite a demanding criterion. Even bearing in mind that we are comparing
against a difficult-to-beat benchmark, our objective with this exercise is to check the usefulness
of the models to complement an approach that takes into account backward- and forward-looking
information alike, as in the case of the EC forecast.
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Table 5: Quantitative forecasting performancea: combination of models’ forecastsb
(mean and median) versus European Commission forecastsc
Government Balance Government revenues Government expenditures
Mean Median EC Mean Median EC Mean Median EC
Full Sample 0.87 0.91 0.82 0.90 0.88 1.47 0.85 0.81 0.68
Q1 0.98 1.04 0.85 1.01 1.00 1.13 0.86 0.75 0.51
Q2 1.06 1.07 0.88 1.03 1.04 1.65 1.06 1.00 0.82
Q3 0.74 0.80 0.88 0.83 0.81 1.65 0.73 0.82 0.82
Q4 0.49 0.49 0.64 0.58 0.51 1.55 0.67 0.71 0.72
Crisis 0.87 0.91 0.81 0.87 0.86 1.49 0.72 0.68 0.59
Q1 0.98 1.04 0.84 1.01 1.00 1.13 0.70 0.64 0.44
Q2 1.05 1.06 0.86 0.99 1.01 1.68 0.96 0.89 0.73
Q3 0.74 0.79 0.86 0.81 0.78 1.68 0.67 0.70 0.73
Q4 0.49 0.48 0.64 0.51 0.44 1.56 0.51 0.46 0.66
a The numbers in the table are the ratios of Root Mean Squared Errors of the errors obtained with each
alternative with respect to an annual random walk approach (no-change baseline).
b For the nominal balance, the error committed for year t by model J from forecast origin Q is defined
as εBAL,Jt,Q ≡ (BALt −BALt−1)−
(
EJΩ,Q [BALt]− EJΩ,Q [BALt−1]
)
. For revenue and expenditure
items, the error committed in year t for item I by model J from forecast origin Q is defined as εI,Jt,Q ≡(
It
It−1
− 1
)
∗ 100 -
(
EJΩ,Q[It]
EJ
Ω,Q[It−1]
− 1
)
∗ 100. Ω makes reference to the information set available at the
time of generating a given forecast, as described in Table 2.
c European Commission forecasts are taken from AMECO real-time vintages. For the nominal balance,
the error committed for year t from forecast origin Q is defined as εBAL,ECt,Q ≡ (BALt −BALt−1)−(
EECQ [BALt]− EECQ [BALt−1]
)
. For total revenues and expenditures, the error committed in year t
for item I is defined as εI,ECt,Q ≡
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
× 100−
(
EECQ [It]
EEC
Q [It−1]
− 1
)
× 100.
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approach. Overall, for the full sample and when all the errors from all forecast horizons are pooled,
EC government balance forecast errors are lower than the mean and the median of the alternative
models. This is also the case as regards full sample government expenditure errors, while in the
case of public revenue the opposite happens. This full-sample picture also holds when looking at
the crisis sample. Quite interestingly, though, Q3- and Q4-based forecast errors are systematically
lower for the combination of models versus EC forecast, both for the whole sample and the crisis
sample. This means that as soon as a sufficient amount of data is available on the implementation
of spending plans and/or the behavior of revenue collection (under our quite restrictive timing
convention in Q3 only the first quarter of the headline general government variable, and half-year
in the case of indicators are available) the models are able to process and extrapolate these data
in a quite informative way. By this we mean, in a way that even tends to outperform a full-
information approach that incorporates in an explicit manner forward-looking elements (policy
measures affecting future quarters). In particular, in Q4 the mean and the median of models
displays a remarkable forecast accuracy. Turning to government revenues, it is surprising the
relative bad forecast accuracy of EC forecasts for government revenue growth projections, a result
that is dominated by the significant forecast errors around GDP turning points, related to the
double-dip crisis.
Turning now to Table 6, the qualitative results shown display similar messages as in the quan-
titative case. Specifically, in the table we present the percentage of correctly predicted changes in
the case of government balance, and the percentage of correctly predicted signs of the growth rate
in the case of government revenues and expenditures.
6.4 Real-time forecasting exercise for the 2011 year
In this subsection we present an additional exercise, this time a truly real-time one, i.e. based on
the exact dataset available at each point in time, is shown in Figure 3. We focus on the fiscal year
2011, a difficult year as discussed in the descriptive Section above.
As discussed, from each forecast origin, and conditional on the short-term information available,
we can compute unconditional forecasts (as the ones shown in the previous examples) but also the
consistency of government targets with these forecasts. In particular in Figure 3 we present in each
single box how the unconditional forecasts (in white color) are updated to the new available infor-
mation, in relation to the actual final data (dots), the targets (thick line red) and the uncertainty
in each case (fanchart up to 99% confidence). The two top rows of charts in Figure 3 shows the
In Table 5 we show the relative RMSE of each alternative with respect to the random walk
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Table 6: Qualitative forecasting performancea: combination of models’ forecastsb
(mean and median) versus European Commission forecastsb
Government Balance Government revenues Government expenditures
Mean Median EC Mean Median EC Mean Median EC
Full Sample 45.8 43.8 58.3 68.8 68.8 39.6 41.7 47.9 62.5
Q1 25.0 25.0 58.3 50.0 50.0 50.0 41.7 41.7 75.0
Q2 33.3 33.3 58.3 66.7 75.0 33.3 16.7 50.0 50.0
Q3 58.3 41.7 58.3 83.3 75.0 33.3 58.3 50.0 50.0
Q4 66.7 75.0 58.3 75.0 75.0 41.7 50.0 50.0 75.0
Crisis 50.0 40.0 35.0 75.0 75.0 40.0 50.0 55.0 70.0
Q1 20.0 20.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 80.0
Q2 40.0 40.0 40.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 40.0 60.0 60.0
Q3 60.0 40.0 40.0 80.0 100.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Q4 80.0 60.0 40.0 100.0 100.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 80.0
a The numbers in the table are the percentage of correctly predicted changes in the case of the government
balance, and the percentage of correctly predicted signs of the growth rate in the case of government
revenues and expenditures.
b See footnotes to Table 5.
results for deficits obtained with models 1 and 2, and the third and fourth rows show total revenues
and expenditures with model 1. Numbers in parentheses in each title shows the probability of
meeting the target, i.e. P (YF ≥ R) for deficits and revenues, and P (YF ≤ R) for expenditures, as
was stated in the previous section.
The two left-upper panels show government balance projections for 2011 from forecast origin
in February 2011. The information available was quite scarce at that point in time: the annual
figure for 2009, quarterly information up to the third quarter of 2010 and monthly indicators for
the month of December in some cases. Thus, it is not surprising to see that confidence bands
generated with both models were quite broad, reflecting a extremely high uncertainty surrounding
the projections (white lines), and a central scenario of further deterioration of the budget balance.
In June 2011, the information available increased substantially: the first estimate for the year 2010
was published and short-term indicators covered up to March 2011. Model 1 (first line of charts)
indicated at that moment an improvement in the budget balance in 2011 compared to 2010, but
still the probability associated with meeting the target was 24% percent, while in the case of Model
2 (joint model of revenues and expenditures) the probability assigned to meeting the target was
zero, i.e. the target was out of the confidence bands of the model forecast. In the latter case, the
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probability assigned to meeting the government revenue target, though, was not null, but was as
small as 5%. The publication of the general government figures for Q1 and of short-term indicators
up to July (September 2011 forecast origin) improved marginally the revenue projection, while in
the case of the direct-deficit-model (model 1) the probability assigned to meeting the target was
around 10%, but sill, in qualitative terms the forecast signalled an improvement in the government
balance, a direction consistent with the objective of the government.
In November 2011 (information set: second quarter of general government variables, short-
term indicators up to September), though, the situation change considerably. Both models were
assigning a zero probability to the event “the target is met”, and at the same time, both models
signalled to basically no improvement in the budget balance compared to the one observed in
2010. In the case of model 2, estimated government revenues for 2011 were for a significant drop
compared to the previous year, and the balance was estimated at more or less the same nominal
amount as in 2010 due to the projected expenditure restraint, as in the official plans (red thick
line). It is worth mentioning that in the last quarter of 2011 the double-dip in real GDP growth
was starting to be evident, a fact that was visible in government revenue aggregates. Compared
to the actual realization of deficits, revenues and expenditures, the estimates computed by those
models in real-time was indeed quite accurate. This is even more clear when looking at the forecast
labeled “February 2012”, that incorporated data for general government, headline variables up to
Q2 2011, and short-term indicators up to November 2011.
The real-time recreation of the use of two of our suggested models for the 2011 episode is quite
illustrative about the potential uses of out system. The bold signals of the models were quite clear,
in particular after the summer. Since November, the two selected models were signalling clearly to
a around 2% of GDP deviation with respect to the official, government target. In the case of the
revenue/spending model, in addition, the slippage was almost fully related to revenue shortages,
while expenditures, even being forecast to be above the target, were relatively close in quantitative
terms. These results contrast with the “herding behavior” observed in Figure 2, and indicates that
the data on the implementation of revenue targets were already hinting towards a sizeable slippage,
despite corrective measures adopted at the end of the summer. Indeed, in August a broadening of
corporate tax bases was approved, and entered into force in Q4, but as not able to compensate the
strong, downward trend in tax collection that was visible at least since November 2011 (with data
available up to September at the maximum).
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Figure 3: Forecasts and fancharts with the limit of 99% confidence.a b
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7 Conclusions and policy discussion
In this paper we present a comprehensive fiscal forecasting system, based on all short-term fiscal
data available for the Spanish case. Our system is made of a suite of models, with different levels
of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down; general government vs sub-sectors) suitable for the
automatic processing of the large amount of monthly/quarterly fiscal data published nowadays by
Spanish statistical authorities.
Beyond presenting the tools as such, in this paper we show some example of its potential ap-
plications for real-time monitoring of public finances. In particular, we show how the combination
of models provides extremely accurate signals when information pertaining to the first half of the
year is available, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Surprisingly enough, the models con-
tain information that seemed not to have been factored into European Commission fiscal forecasts,
that are among the best performers within the set of international organizations, and supposedly
incorporate not only past data, but also forward-looking information on approved, but not yet
implemented, policy measures. In addition, we provide a truly real-time application to the analysis
if the huge budgetary deviation of the fiscal year 2011, showing the potential of the models in
capturing in advance most of the ex-post observed deviation. Thus, we claim that our tools might
potentially be instrumental for ex-ante detection of risks to official projections, and thus can help
in reducing the ex-post reputational costs of budgetary deviations.
From a policy-making point of view, we also claim that official monitoring bodies could in-
corporate in their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence to targets more formal elements, of the
kind presented in our paper, in order to move the standard evaluation procedure beyond the ex-
tant, more “legalistic” approach. In addition, presenting model-based results, or uncertainty tests
around government targets, as the ones shown in our real-time exercise, may be helpful to convey
to the public risks surrounding fiscal projections (on this subject see also Clark et al., 2013). Incor-
porating these type of elements may help in improving communication policies as regards sources
of risks of (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets as well as reasons for (ex-post) budgetary
deviations had them occurred.
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A Appendix: econometric methodology
All the models developed in our paper fit with the following general discussion. The description
follows quite closely Pedregal and Pe´rez (2010). The starting point of the modeling approach is to
consider a multivariate Unobserved Components Model known as the Basic Structural Model (Har-
vey, 1989). A given time series is decomposed into unobserved components which are meaningful
from an economic point of view (trend, Tt, seasonal, St, and irregular, et). Equation (4) displays a
general form, where t is a time sub-index measured in quarters, zt denotes the variable in ESA95
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terms expressed at an annual and quarterly sampling interval (depending on availability) for our
objective time series, and ut represents the vector of quarterly indicators.
⎡
⎣ zt
ut
⎤
⎦ = Tt + St + et (4)
The general consensus in this type of multivariate models in order to enable identifiability is to
build SUTSE models (Seemingly Unrelated Structural Time Series). This means that components
of the same type interact among them for different time series, but are independent of any of
the components of different types. In addition, statistical relations are only allowed through the
covariance structure of the vector noises, but never through the system matrices directly. This
allows that, trends of different time series may relate to each other, but all of them are independent
of both the seasonal and irregular components. The full model is a standard BSM that may be
written in State-Space form as (see Harvey, 1989)
xt = Φxt−1 +Ewt (5)⎡
⎣ zt
ut
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ H
Hu
⎤
⎦xt +
⎡
⎣ t
vt
⎤
⎦ (6)
where t ∼ N(0,Σ) and vt ∼ N(0,Σvt). The system matrices Φ, E, H and Hu in equations
(5)-(6) include the particular definitions of the components and all the vector noises have the usual
Gaussian properties with zero mean and constant covariance matrices (t and vt are correlated
among them, but both are independent of wt). The particular structure of the covariance matrices
of the observed and transition noises defines the structures of correlations among the components
across output variables. The mixture of frequencies, and the estimation of models at the quarterly
frequency, implies combining variables that at the quarterly frequency can be considered as stocks
with those being pure flows. This may be achieved by including the output variables in the state
vector and defining an accumulator variable as defined in equation (7).
Ct =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, t = first quarter
1, otherwise
(7)
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to the previous system.
⎡
⎣ zt
xt
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ Ct ⊗ I HΦ
0 Φ
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ zt−1
xt−1
⎤
⎦+
⎡
⎣ 1 HE
0 E
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ t
wt
⎤
⎦ (8)
⎡
⎣ zt
ut
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ I 0
0 Hu
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ zt
xt
⎤
⎦+
⎡
⎣ 0
I
⎤
⎦ vt (9)
Given the structure of the system and the information available, the Kalman Filter and Fixed
Interval Smoother algorithms provide an optimal estimation of states. Maximum likelihood in the
time domain provides optimal estimates of the unknown system matrices, which in the present
context are just covariance matrices of all the vector noises involved in the model. The use of
the models selected and the estimation procedures described in the previous paragraph, allows
the estimation of models with unbalanced data sets, i.e. input variables with different sample
lengths. This is a feature of relevance for the construction of the database at hand, given occasional
differences in temporal coverage of indicators.
In our case, particular empirical specifications for each variable will be considered in the light
of the available information (fiscal indicators). Let us provide some examples. For instance, for
the case of the individual model for total government revenues, z comprises total government
revenues in National Accounts terms, a variable that is available at the annual frequency from
1986-1999 and at the quarterly frequency from 2000Q1-2012Q4, while u is a matrix composed
of three series (available at the quarterly frequency for the whole sample period): (i) a proxy to
general government total revenues in public accounts (cash) terms; (ii) Central government total
revenues and (iii) Social Security (SSS+SPEE) sector’s total revenues. Models with more than one
National Accounts variable also fit within the general formulation of this Section. In those cases, z
includes several variables and thus u would have been a matrix with indicators by blocks for each
component of z. For example, in the case of the model that jointly estimates and forecasts total
revenues (TOR) and total expenditures (TOE) z= {TOR, TOE }.
In this way system (5)-(6) becomes (8)-(9). Beware that by setting Ct = 0 we return actually
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